VIETNAM: TAKEN TO WAR ON A LIE

The Truth About the Gulf of Tonkin: Unravelling a Pivotal Moment in History

On 2 August 1964, North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats attacked the USS *Maddox* (DD-731) in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. This event is indisputable. However, the events of 4 August 1964—and the subsequent actions by U.S. officials—have long been shrouded in confusion and controversy. Thanks to nearly 200 documents declassified by the National Security Agency (NSA) in 2005 and 2006, we now have a clearer picture of what transpired and how these events propelled the United States into the Vietnam War. This blog post explores the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, the misleading narratives that followed, and their lasting consequences.

Raids and Patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin

In early 1964, South Vietnam, with U.S. backing, launched covert commando raids and intelligence-gathering missions along the North Vietnamese coast under Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A. Overseen by the Department of Defense (DoD) and supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), these operations involved South Vietnamese Navy attacks on North Vietnamese targets. However, the raids suffered heavy losses, prompting Lieutenant General William C. Westmoreland to shift tactics to shore bombardments using mortars and rockets from patrol boats.

Simultaneously, the U.S. Navy conducted Desoto patrols in the Gulf, gathering signals intelligence (SIGINT) and reconnaissance. A declassified 2005 document revealed that these patrols aimed to “locate and identify all coastal radar transmitters” and monitor North Vietnamese maritime activities. While these operations were not coordinated with OPLAN 34A, their proximity risked being perceived as collaborative aggression against North Vietnam.

The Daylight Attack on 2 August

On 28 July 1964, the USS *Maddox*, equipped with SIGINT specialists, began a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam’s coast. On the night of 30–31 July, South Vietnamese commandos under OPLAN 34A attacked Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands. Unaware of these raids, the *Maddox* withdrew after observing North Vietnamese patrol boats pursuing the raiders. By 1 August, the destroyer resumed its patrol. The next day, SIGINT intercepted reports of North Vietnamese vessels preparing to attack. At 1440, three patrol boats approached, and after warning shots, a brief battle ensued. The *Maddox*, supported by F-8 Crusaders from the USS *Ticonderoga* (CVA-14), damaged the attackers, who retreated.

Lieutenant General William Westmoreland (center), commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, approved increasing the number of South Vietnamese–conducted OPLAN 34A raids against the North and shifting tactics from inserting commandoes to shore bombardments.

Phantom Attacks on 4 August

To assert navigational rights, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the USS *Turner Joy* (DD-951) to join the *Maddox* on patrol. That night, South Vietnamese forces conducted further OPLAN 34A raids, attacking North Vietnamese installations. Amid poor weather and malfunctioning radars, the destroyers reported multiple threats, including torpedo attacks and enemy vessels. Over three hours, they fired 249 5-inch shells, 123 3-inch shells, and depth charges. However, Commander James Stockdale, flying overhead, saw no enemy boats, later stating, “There was nothing there but black water and American firepower.”

Captain John J. Herrick, aboard the *Maddox*, grew sceptical, attributing the “attacks” to overeager sonar operators and faulty equipment. By 0127 on 5 August, he sent a message expressing doubts: “Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by MADDOX.”

Confusion and Deception in Washington

Declassified tapes from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library reveal the chaos in Washington. Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, Pacific Fleet Commander, received conflicting reports. A North Vietnamese SIGINT message claiming to have “shot down two planes” was misinterpreted as evidence of an attack on 4 August, when it actually referred to 2 August. Despite doubts from Herrick and Stockdale, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara treated this as proof of an attack. On 4 August, President Johnson announced retaliatory airstrikes on national television, claiming “repeated acts of violence” against U.S. forces.

On 5 August, Commander Stockdale led a strike against North Vietnamese targets, destroying an oil depot but losing two U.S. aircraft. On 7 August, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, granting Johnson broad authority to use military force without congressional oversight. Johnson reportedly remarked that the resolution “was like Grandma’s nightshirt. It covers everything.”

The Evidence Unravelled

Historian Robert J. Hanyok’s 2001 study, published in the NSA’s *Cryptologic Quarterly*, concluded that no attack occurred on 4 August. His analysis, detailed in the National Security Archive, revealed that 90% of SIGINT intercepts contradicting the attack narrative were withheld from decision-makers. Some messages were altered or falsified, creating a misleading picture. Hanyok stated, “SIGINT information was presented in such a manner as to preclude responsible decision makers… from having the complete and objective narrative.”

Navy Captain John J. Herrick (left), pictured with Maddox skipper Commander Herbert L. Ogier on board the destroyer, kept his superiors informed during the alleged battle with North Vietnamese PT boats on 4 August. But several hours later he forwarded his doubts about what had happened up the chain of command. Naval Historical Center

McNamara’s role was particularly troubling. On 6 August, he misled Congress, denying knowledge of OPLAN 34A’s provocative nature. Yet, a declassified tape shows him admitting to Johnson that the 2 August attack was likely a response to these raids. CIA Director John McCone also noted that North Vietnam was reacting defensively to U.S.-backed operations.

The Consequences of Deception

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution marked a turning point, enabling unchecked U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. Historian H. R. McMaster, in his book *Dereliction of Duty*, argues that Johnson and McNamara deceived Congress to bolster Johnson’s re-election campaign and counter accusations of weakness. McNamara, in his 2003 documentary *The Fog of War*, remained unapologetic, even boasting about evading questions.

The omission of critical evidence denied Congress its constitutional role in overseeing military actions. This led to America’s deepest involvement in Vietnam, a conflict that became one of the longest and costliest in U.S. history.

Reflections on Tonkin

The Gulf of Tonkin incident highlights the dangers of acting on incomplete or manipulated intelligence. Johnson’s election-driven zeal and McNamara’s distortions created an environment where hasty conclusions trumped caution. While the Vietnam War may have escalated regardless, the events of August 1964 accelerated U.S. involvement under false pretences. Understanding this history reminds us of the importance of transparency and accountability in decision-making, especially when lives and nations are at stake.

President Johnson is overcome with grief as he listens to a tape sent by his son-in-law, Captain Charles Robb, from Vietnam in 1968. In early August 1964, Johnson’s and McNamara’s zeal for aggressive action in Southeast Asia led to full U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, which cost the lives of more than 58,000 American service men and women. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

*For further reading, explore the declassified documents at the National Security Archive or dive into McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty for a deeper analysis of this critical moment in history.*